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The following report summarizes my first compliance reports as Monitor under the National Mortgage 
Settlement, which I have filed with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. It 
includes:
• An overview of the process through which my colleagues and I have reviewed the servicers’ work.
• Summaries of each servicer’s results and scorecards regarding their compliance for the first and 
second test periods (the third and fourth calendar quarters of 2012), as well as initial disclosure 
from testing conducted during the third test period (the first calendar quarter of 2013). 
• Information about consequences set forth in the Settlement for servicers after a potential violation 
is reported or discovered. 
• An analysis of complaints received from consumers and during meetings with distressed 
borrowers and the professionals who represent them.
• A discussion of additional testing measures I am exploring. 
• An update on my work to complete the consumer relief reports.
Because the servicing standards on which the metrics being tested are based were phased in during 2012, 
testing for the periods covered by my compliance reports did not include all the metrics established by the 
Settlement. All of the metrics have been tested, however, through the first calendar quarter of 2013 and 
will be covered by future reports to the Court and the public. 
As more fully discussed in this summary report, there were three metric fails in 2012 and five metric fails 
in the first quarter of 2013, confirming much of what I have heard during the last year from state attorneys 
general, housing counselors, advocates and distressed borrowers. The Settlement requires that the 
servicers create and implement corrective action plans and institute remediation efforts, all of which my 
professionals and I are currently overseeing. 
While it is still early in the compliance monitoring process, it is clear to me the Settlement has allowed 
us to uncover issues with the servicers’ activities that need to be rectified. My job is to hold the servicers 
accountable to the commitments they made under the Settlement. I intend to continue to do just that. 
I hope that the compliance reports just filed with the Court  
will inform the public and policymakers, and I look forward  
to engaging in a conversation about the findings outlined  
in the following pages. 
Sincerely,
Joseph A. Smith, Jr. Monitor
Play video                                                                        
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Introduction
As required by the National Mortgage Settlement (Settlement or NMS), I have filed 
compliance reports with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
for each servicer that is a party to the Settlement. These reports provide the results 
of my findings regarding their compliance with the servicing standards established 
by the NMS. This document summarizes these reports, which cover the third and 
fourth calendar quarters of 2012, or test periods one and two. These reports are the 
first public step in a monitoring process that will continue for the next several years. 
Copies of the reports filed with the Court are available on my website:  
www.mortgageoversight.com.
I have long believed that the servicing standards are the most important and lasting component of the NMS. Improving 
the way servicers work with their customers is an important part of reforming home mortgage finance to better balance 
efficiency and fairness. While I hope these reports will contribute to the national conversation around the servicers’ 
compliance with the Settlement, it is important to remember that they cover only the first two test periods. Subsequent 
reports will provide additional detail.
Testing Process
To test compliance with the 304 servicing standards,  
I have worked closely with a team of professionals. Last  
year, I hired BDO Consulting, a division of BDO USA, LLP  
(BDO) to serve as my primary professional firm (PPF).  
I chose BDO due to its substantial financial services  
industry expertise, capacity and lack of meaningful  
conflicts with any of the servicers I am monitoring.  
To assist in the review of servicer performance, I  
retained five secondary professional firms (SPFs) and  
have assigned one to each servicer. These firms also  
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To assess how well the servicers adhere to the 304 servicing 
standards, or rules, outlined in the NMS, the servicers and the 
professionals in my employ and I use a series of 29 metrics, or 
tests. Each of the servicers and I negotiated a separate work plan 
that specifies how the tests are carried out and validated. The 
Monitoring Committee, comprised of representatives from 15 states, 
the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
and the United States Department of Justice, reviewed these work 
plans and, after providing input, did not object to their adoption. 
Each servicer has assigned a group of employees who are 
independent from the servicer’s mortgage loan servicing operations 
to ensure the servicer’s activities are compliant. This group of 
employees, called the Internal Review Group (IRG), uses the  
servicer’s system of record to compile the full population of loans 
related to each metric and then tests a statistically valid sample 
to determine whether the servicer has passed the metric. The SPF 
assigned to the servicer then reviews the work papers of the IRG  
and retests a sub-sample of the IRG’s test sample in a process 
overseen by the PPF and me. 
Each servicer implemented the servicing standards according to 
a unique schedule. As a result, different servicers were ready for 
testing on different metrics at different times. During test periods 
one and two, servicers were not tested on all 29 metrics. Some 
metrics were tested for some servicers and not tested for others. 
If a metric was not tested by a servicer in test period one or two, it 
was tested for the first time in test period three (the first calendar 
quarter of 2013) and will be the subject of upcoming reports.
If a servicer’s IRG reports that it failed a metric, the NMS deems this 
a potential violation that the servicer can cure. The servicer must 
create and implement a corrective action plan (CAP) to address 
the root cause of the fail. I review and, once satisfied, approve the 
CAP. Additionally, the servicer compensates borrowers identified 
during the testing who were harmed by the potential violation. 
If the potential violation is widespread, remediation must cover 
all borrowers who were harmed dating back to the servicer’s 
implementation of the relevant servicing standard or standards.  
The SPF, PPF, and I then regularly review and test the 
implementation of these remediation plans until the servicer asserts, 
and I confirm, that its remediation is complete. 
Though the review process is summarized for purposes of this 
document, it is, in fact, extensive and exhaustive. The work 
conducted to test the five servicers during the first two periods 
involved 195 professionals including my PPF, SPFs, and other 





Bank of America, N.A.
During the two test periods covered in this report (July 1-Sept. 
30, 2012 and Oct. 1-Dec. 31, 2012), Bank of America, N.A. (Bank 
of America) was tested on a total of 12 metrics. These include 
metrics related to providing borrowers with a single point of contact, 
completing a foreclosure sale in error, assessing fees in error, 
affidavit integrity, complaint response timeliness, and accuracy of 
loan modification denials, among others (for more information, see  
Metric Testing Timeline). 
Bank of America was not tested on 17 metrics during the first 
two test periods because of the timing of its servicing standards 
implementation that related to the metrics. Bank of America did not 
fail any of the 12 metrics tested during the first two test periods. 
By the end of test period three, as is the case for all the servicers, 
Bank of America had been tested on all the metrics. Bank of 
America has recently disclosed to the Monitoring Committee and 
me that it failed Metrics 6 and 19 in the third test period. Metric 6 
requires accurate information in a letter the servicers are required 
by the Settlement to send to borrowers before starting foreclosure, 
and Metric 19 measures whether the servicer is complying with 
the requirement to notify the borrower of any missing documents 
in the borrower’s loan modification application within five days of 
receipt. Bank of America has begun work on proposed CAPs for 
these potential violations. I have not yet verified their findings or 
conducted my own testing, and will report on these matters in my 
next compliance report to the Court and the public. 
J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
My team and I tested J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) on 
11 metrics through the end of the first two test periods, including 
metrics related to affidavit integrity, providing borrowers with a 
single point of contact, complaint response timeliness, and force-
placed insurance termination, among others (for more information, 
see Metric Testing Timeline).
During its IRG review, Chase disclosed to the Monitoring 
Committee and me a potential violation of Metric 29, which tests 
whether the servicer terminates force-placed insurance coverage 
within 15 days of receipt of evidence of existing coverage. Chase 
prepared, and I approved, a CAP. Chase has voluntarily remediated 
all affected borrowers under that plan for a period commencing 
in April 2012. Chase reported that it has provided remediation by 
refunding premiums to over 2,000 borrowers. This amounts to 
more remediation than the NMS requires for a widespread error. 
Chase has completed its CAP and has resumed testing Metric 29. 
My PPF, SPF, and I will review such testing and Chase’s remediation 
activities and provide our determination as to each of these 
activities in my next compliance report. 
Additionally, Chase has disclosed to the Monitoring Committee 
and me that it failed Metric 20 during the third test period. Metric 
20 measures whether the servicer follows the timelines for making 
a decision on a borrower’s loan modification application and 
for notifying the customer of its denial decision. I am currently 
reviewing Chase’s proposed Metric 20 CAP, including a review of 
the need for remediation. Information on these activities also will  
be publicly available in my next report. 
Bank of America scorecard Chase scorecard
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CitiMortgage, Inc.
CitiMortgage, Inc. (Citi) was tested on 15 metrics through the 
end of the second test period. These include metrics related to 
incorrect denial of a loan modification, affidavit integrity, proof of 
claim, appropriateness of fees, work force management, providing 
borrowers with a single point of contact, compliance with the loan 
modification decision/notification timelines, and force-placed 
insurance notification and termination, among others (for more 
information, see Metric Testing Timeline). 
Citi reported to the Monitoring Committee and me a potential 
violation of Metric 19 during test period two. Metric 19 tests 
whether the servicer is complying with the timeliness requirement 
to notify the borrower of any missing documents in the borrower’s 
loan modification application. Citi is currently implementing a CAP 
and, because I determined the error to be widespread, is working 
with my professionals and me to ensure that any borrower harmed 
by this potential violation is appropriately compensated. 
Citi has disclosed to the Monitoring Committee and me that it 
failed two additional metrics during the third test period. These 
include Metric 6, which requires accurate information in a letter 
the servicers are required by the Settlement to send to borrowers 
before starting foreclosure, and Metric 23, which measures the 
requirement to notify borrowers about missing documents within 
30 days of a request for a short sale. Citi has submitted to me 
proposed CAPs for both metrics, and I am now reviewing them. 
In my next public report, after I have done the necessary work, I 
will provide additional information regarding my review of Citi’s 
compliance activities and Citi’s CAPs. 
ResCap Parties (formerly Ally/GMAC)
The ResCap Parties (formerly Ally/GMAC) have been tested on 11 
metrics through the end of the second test period. (See the Metrics 
Testing Timeline.) To date, neither the IRG nor my professionals 
have found evidence of a failed metric. 
The ResCap Parties were subject to a Feb. 5, 2013 bankruptcy court 
order that split up and transferred their servicing rights and assets 
to Ocwen Financial Corporation (Ocwen), Green Tree Servicing 
(Green Tree), and Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (Berkshire). Ocwen 
acquired approximately 80 percent of the servicing rights and 
assets, Green Tree 18.5 percent, and Berkshire 1.5 percent. I have 
met with representatives from Ocwen on multiple occasions, and 
testing will continue on course. I will make publicly available the 
results of these reviews in my next reports. I have had exchanges 
with Green Tree and will negotiate an implementation schedule 
for its compliance with the servicing standards, which will dictate 
when testing resumes for its portion of the ResCap Parties’ portfolio. 
Representatives from Berkshire and I have yet to determine how it 
will participate in the NMS. 
Citi scorecard ResCap scorecard
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Wells Fargo & Company
Wells Fargo & Company (Wells Fargo) was tested on 
a total of 20 metrics through the end of the second 
test period (see the Metrics Testing Timeline). 
In test period two, Wells Fargo reported to the 
Monitoring Committee and me a potential violation 
of Metric 19, which measures compliance with the 
requirement to notify the borrower of any missing 
documents in the borrower’s loan modification 
application within five days. Wells Fargo is 
implementing a CAP, and I will report on Wells 
Fargo’s performance on Metric 19 and other metrics 
in my next compliance reports to the Court. 
Wells Fargo scorecard
What happens when they fail?
Consequences of a  
Potential Violation
As explained in the above summaries of each 
servicer’s performance, failing a metric requires 
the servicer to develop a plan to correct its related 
practices. The CAP must address the root causes 
of the failure and must be approved by me. While 
a servicer is implementing a CAP, my PPF and the 
assigned SPF communicate with the servicer to 
monitor progress and identify any issues. Once the 
servicer asserts that it has integrated the measures 
outlined in the CAP, the PPF and assigned SPF 
review their work. A servicer’s CAP is not complete 
until confirmed by me. If it is completed in the 
first month of a quarter, testing recommences 
that quarter. Otherwise, testing begins again the 
next quarter. In addition to the CAP, if the failure 
is determined to be widespread, the servicer must 
remediate, or compensate for, any material harm to 
its customers.
If the servicer fails the same metric again, within 
either of the first two quarters after completion 
of the CAP, the Monitoring Committee and I may 
take enforcement action through the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia. This may 
include injunctive relief and civil penalties up to $1 
million or, in certain circumstances, $5 million.
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Consumer Complaints
In addition to the testing activities described above, I have 
had regular meetings with state attorneys general, housing 
counselors, advocates, and distressed borrowers. As a 
result of these meetings I am certain that more work needs 
to be done to improve the way the servicers are treating 
their customers. 
The NMS requires that each servicer submit to me 
Executive Office complaints, or complaints that are filed 
with the servicers by the offices of elected officials on 
behalf of their constituents. Between October 1, 2012 and 
March 31, 2013, my professionals and I had received and 
analyzed 59,586 Executive Office complaints from the five 
servicers. The most frequent Executive Office complaints 
are related to single points of contact, dual tracking, the 
loan modification process, and accuracy of customers’ 
account information.
My colleagues and I also receive complaints directly 
from state attorneys general offices and have access to 
complaints submitted to the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB). We compare these complaints to those I 
receive from the servicers to make sure my colleagues and 
I are benefiting from all relevant complaints. 
Additionally, we review the complaints submitted through 
my website by professionals who work on borrowers’ 
behalf, which provide an independent source of information 
to supplement the other sources. Between May 10, 2012 
and May 10, 2013, professionals had submitted 797 
complaints through my website. Their most frequent 
complaints include issues with the loan modification 




Based on what I have learned over the last year, I have concluded 
that while servicing practices have improved in some respects, 
there remain areas of concern. These areas include issues with 
the loan modification process, customer service, including the 
single point of contact, and billing and statement inaccuracies.
The NMS gives me, after consulting with the servicers and the 
Monitoring Committee, the authority to impose discretionary 
metrics, in addition to the 29 laid out in the Settlement. I am 
currently at work with the servicers and Monitoring Committee 
to use this authority to address concerns I have heard around the 
country and through my review of consumer complaints. I look 
forward to reporting our progress on this important work. 
Consumer Relief
The PPF is working diligently to confirm the crediting of 
consumer relief that the servicers have claimed through the end 
of 2012. It is my expectation that I will submit additional Monitor 
Reports on consumer relief to the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia within the next six weeks. 
Additionally, I secured the servicers’ agreement to sit individually 
for an interview with my PPF and me. During these interviews, 
servicers respond to a series of questions about consumer relief 
requirements that are not part of the crediting process. These 
questions cover the servicers’ obligations with regard to certain 
geographies, protected classes of borrowers, mandatory second 
lien extinguishments, and avoidance of double-counting of 
governmental incentive payments, among other matters. I intend 
to comment on these additional requirements in my upcoming 
Monitor Reports concerning consumer relief. 
Conclusion
The Monitor Reports that I have just filed with the Court show that 
the Settlement is having the intended effect of uncovering problems 
with servicer performance. The potential violations revealed by this 
process are consistent with what I have been hearing from consumers, 
state attorneys general, advocates, and housing counselors around 
the country. CAPs, including remediation when required, have been 
implemented or are in process. If the CAPs are not successful, the 
Monitoring Committee and I will take additional action, as dictated by 
the Settlement. 
It is clear to me that the servicers have additional work to do both in their efforts to fully comply with 
the NMS and to regain their customers’ trust. There continue to be issues with the loan modification 
process, single point of contact, and customer records. To that end, I am working on additional metrics 
to better address the issues that a year’s experience has revealed. I will make those metrics publicly 
available as soon as they are finalized.
I continue to believe that the NMS is a valuable and effective contribution to an improved system of 
residential mortgage finance. The problems it addresses are large and complex; improvement will take 
time. This report and those that follow will inform policymakers and the public in a way that I hope will 
support confidence in this process and understanding of how the home mortgage finance system can, 
and should, evolve. 
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